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Abstract The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body 
responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues 
of global importance and consequently receive perks – election to the UNSC predicts, for 
instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this 
question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete 
choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the 
latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 
180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a 
compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and 
a norm of giving each country its turn. We do find evidence that richer countries from the 
developing world win election more often, while involvement in warfare lowers election 
probability. By contrast, development aid does not predict election. 
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1. Introduction 
Endowed with the legal power to authorize whatever foreign policies it deems necessary to 
maintain international peace and security, the Security Council has become the preeminent 
organ of the United Nations (UN). It has the legal authority to suspend economic and 
diplomatic relations between countries, impose blockades, and authorize the use of armed 
force (see Voeten 2001; Hurd 2007; Chapman 2011). The body includes 15 members: the 
five ever-present Permanent Members, and the ten Non-Permanent Members (NPMs), who 
must win election to serve limited two-year terms.  
Our study seeks to explain which countries win election to the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) as NPMs. Note that at least four NPMs must vote in favor of a resolution for 
it to pass, giving these members a central role on the world stage. The President of the 
Security Council – a position that rotates among the members – has influence over the agenda 
and the order of voting (Bailey and Daws 1998: 130-131). Most importantly, the UNSC votes 
by open ballot so that the voice of an elected member has a global reach on central matters of 
world security. Accordingly, some countries appear willing to bribe and reward NPMs. For 
instance, the United States increases bilateral foreign aid by more than 50% when a country 
serves on the UNSC (Kuziemko and Werker 2006). Also, NPMs become more likely to 
receive World Bank project loans and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans with 
relatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al. 2009a; 2009b; 2010). Asian NPMs see their loans 
from the Asian Development Bank rise around 30% (Lim and Vreeland 2013).  
Understanding which countries receive these rewards can serve to inform longstanding 
economic questions over the allocation and effects of foreign aid and IMF/World Bank loans 
(see, e.g., Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Does the 
UNSC election process direct these funds towards countries with particular characteristics? 
Kuziemko and Werker (2006: 909), following Malone (2000), assert that “Service on the 
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Council is by no means random.” Yet, to our knowledge, no established study details the 
systematic determinants of election to the Security Council.
1
 
The power to elect the NPMs formally rests in the hands of the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA), which includes delegates from all UN member countries. Usually, 
however, the UNGA vote serves as a mere ratification of decisions made by regional 
caucuses, which play a privileged role in the nomination process. Only when there remains 
disagreement at the regional level, which happens in about 20% of elections, does the UNGA 
vote become meaningful. On these occasions, the interplay of two separate sets of 
preferences – those at the regional level and those at the global level (the UNGA) – determine 
election to the UNSC.  
What shapes these preferences? To choose NPMs, the UN Charter calls on government 
representatives to consider “the contribution of members of the United Nations to the 
maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the 
Organization.” In practice, however, matters are more complex. A detailed set of procedural 
rules and at least two unwritten gentlemen’s agreements also shape the UNSC election 
procedure. Moreover, UN Ambassadors appear to consider factors beyond contributions to 
peacekeeping: political affiliations, economic strength, and foreign aid may all play a role. 
For instance, Iceland’s sudden financial collapse in 2008 seemingly derailed what had 
                                                 
1
 Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) briefly analyze the determinants of UNSC membership with a probit 
model, but the authors focus on the effects of membership. Region-specific studies have been published. Lim 
and Vreeland (2013) use a logit model conditioned on year to examine the election of Asian countries. Scharioth 
(2010) analyzes the election of Western European countries to various UN committees. Part of the work here is 
based on our earlier working paper (Dreher and Vreeland 2009). Two other working papers on the election of 
UNSC members that have been presented at conferences include Iwanami (2012) and Schmitz and Schwarze 
(2012). Thorough qualitative accounts of the selection of specific UNSC members have been published, e.g., 
Malone (1998; 2000), and Jayakumar (2011). 
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previously looked a secure candidacy, while US support for the candidature of Guatemala 
appeared important in stymieing the rival candidacy of Venezuela in 2006. Cases such as 
these might just represent idiosyncrasies, but they may also be part of a regular pattern. How 
then should one go about investigating the systematic determinants of UNSC election? 
To investigate discrete choice settings, scholars often employ the conditional (fixed effects) 
logit model in which a single decision-maker chooses a single option according to utility 
maximization (see McFadden 1973). The UNSC election process differs from this model in at 
least two respects. First, as discussed above, up to two different sets of preferences can be in 
play: the regional and the global. Second, in some election years the UNGA regularly elects 
two candidates from one region, not just a single candidate. We therefore develop a multiple-
discrete choice model that extends the conditional logit model to allow, in a simple way, for 
the separate identification of two intermingling sets of preferences, and for the number of 
choices from the set of alternatives to vary (from zero to two). 
Our empirical analysis of election to the UNSC considers five broad theoretical questions: (i) 
Does the UNGA follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace, as directed by the 
UN Charter? (ii) Does the receipt of foreign aid predict UNSC election? (iii) Is election 
driven by international power or close relationships with powerful countries? (iv) Do cultural 
traits play a role? (v) Do governments practice a turn-taking norm of sharing seats by rotating 
through the eligible candidates? The last question derives from the common misconception 
that membership on the UNSC “rotates” through the full UN membership roster. Formally, 
membership does not rotate, but in practice the regional groups and the UNGA might follow 
such a norm.  
Analyzing data on UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005, we find some evidence of a 
commitment to peace. At least countries engaged in intra- or inter-state conflict since the end 
of the Cold War are less likely to win election from Africa or from Latin America and the 
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Caribbean. There is also a positive link between troop contributions to UN peacekeeping 
missions and election from Africa and Asia. 
As for international power, all regions except Eastern Europe exhibit some evidence of a 
preference for populous countries. We also find evidence that richer countries, measured by 
gross national income (GNI) per capita, enjoy an advantage in Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America.  
We find only patchy, and somewhat mixed, evidence that foreign financial support 
determines election. US development assistance does not predict election from the 
developing world, and US military support similarly plays little role in regional decisions. 
When the UNGA votes, however, countries that receive US military assistance – as opposed 
to development aid – are more likely to win election.2  
Political-cultural factors appear to hold occasional influence within regions. Governments 
that share a common political ideology with their region are more likely to be elected from 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, but not from other regions. Colonial legacy also has 
mixed effects. A British colonial legacy helps in Asia, Latin America, and Western Europe 
but not in Africa. Corruption also has inconsistent effects. It pays off only in Africa and Latin 
America, and the effect in Africa is of marginal statistical significance. In contrast to these 
findings, the UNGA as a body has shunned corrupt countries since the end of the Cold War. 
Indeed, our results suggest the presence of significant heterogeneity in the determinants of 
UNSC election across regions. Therefore, while culture and history have marginal and 
inconsistent effects within regions, they may drive substantial differences across regions. 
                                                 
2
 Strictly speaking, US military aid does not count as official overseas development assistance, according to the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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“Turn-taking” stands as the only finding that holds across all regions and time periods 
without exception. A country whose turn arrives is more likely to receive regional 
nomination, which accords with the common “rotation” perception. These regional turn-
taking rights do not, however, hold sway in elections contested at the UNGA level. 
The results of this study contribute to the ongoing discussion of UNSC reform, which centers 
on the question of representation but lacks a systematic study of membership (see Hosli et al. 
2011). Our analysis also connects to the literature on leader selection (e.g., Hamermesh and 
Schmidt 2003, Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011). Importantly, we further contribute a generic 
econometric model of elections wherein there is a nomination process at one level and an 
endorsement vote at another (also see Glasgow et al. 2012 and Golder et al. 2012). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the UNSC election process, and Section 3 
presents various hypotheses about the determinants of election. In Section 4 we formally 
develop the econometric model, providing a likelihood equation for UNSC election, and 
discuss important methodological details. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 
concludes with some implications of our main findings. 
 
2. The election process 
The UNSC election process for NPMs follows certain rules and agreements.
3
 The ten NPM 
seats are divided among five regional caucusing groups: one country from Eastern Europe 
(EE); two from the Western European and Others Group (WEOG); two from the Latin 
America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC – el Grupo Latinoamericano y Caribeño); and five 
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 Some background for this section comes from Security Council Report, an independent not-for-profit 
organization: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org. We also draw on Luck (2006). 
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from Africa and Asia.
4
 An unwritten, but unbroken, gentlemen’s agreement divides the five 
seats for Africa and Asia into three seats for Africa and two seats for Asia. Around 1968, a 
further unrecorded agreement between Africa and Asia reserved one of their five seats for an 
Arab state, with the regions taking turns every two years to provide a suitable candidate 
(Security Council Report 2011: 7). This seat is often called the “Arab swing seat.”  
The UNGA conducts staggered elections for five seats every autumn. Terms begin the 
following January.
5
 To be eligible for election, a country must, first, belong to one of the five 
regional caucusing groups. Prior to 2000, when it gained temporary membership in the 
WEOG, Israel was not a member of any group (Security Council Report 2011: 6); and 
Estonia, having joined the UN in 1991, did not become a member of the Eastern European 
(EE) caucus until 2004 (Estonia 2011) while it awaited the outcome of an (ultimately 
unsuccessful) application to the WEOG (Daws 1999). The small island-country of Kiribati, 
which has never designated a permanent representative to the UN, is the only country to 
presently have no group affiliation (UN 2012). Second, NPMs in the final year of their terms 
cannot run for immediate re-election (UN Charter 23(2)). 
                                                 
4
 The “others” in the modern-day WEOG include descendent countries of Western Europe, mainly from the 
British Commonwealth: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The United States also caucuses with this group, 
as do Turkey and, more recently, Israel (see, e.g., Security Council Report 2011). Before 1966, there were only 
six elected UNSC members. See Daws (1999) for the development of the UN regional groups. 
5
 The Eastern European term begins in even years. The two WEOG terms begin in odd years. The GRULAC 
and ASIA stagger their two terms; the UNGA elects one from each of these groups every year. Africa’s three 
terms are also staggered: two begin in even years and one in odd years. The Arab term (shared between Asia and 
Africa) begins in even years. 
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Countries may declare candidacy by notifying the chairman of their regional group.
6
 Before 
voting begins in the UNGA, the chairman of each group announces the countries that have 
declared candidacy (the chairman’s list).7 Although details of the regional negotiations are 
scarce, there appears to be a preference for the choice of NPMs to be kept “in house,” insofar 
as is possible. The vote in the UNGA is, as a result, usually sidelined by regional groups 
offering a “clean slate,” whereby the chairman announces only as many candidatures as seats 
available.
 
Contested elections, when the chairman announces more candidatures than seats 
available, appear to occur when efforts at agreement at the regional level have failed.
8
  
Africa appears to have the most disciplined rules for selecting candidates.
9
 It operates a 
system of turn-taking within sub-regional groups, which should, in theory, ensure that all 
countries in Africa eventually serve on the Security Council.
10
 Even here, however, the 
situation is more complex than might first appear. According to the independent not-for-
                                                 
6
 We know from the UNGA’s minutes that group chairmen stand up in sequence before the vote and announce 
the group’s candidates. The chairman position rotates among the region members, and terms last one month. See 
various issues of the Journal of the United Nations for details on specific elections 
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/journal.asp, accessed 5 April 2012). 
7
 Sometimes countries announce their intention to run years in advance. Other times they do so much later, even 
in the midst of elections. The timing of such announcements appears idiosyncratic, and data are not available.  
8
 For the 36 election-years (1970-2005) we analyze, the WEOG is the most competitive group, with nine 
contested elections, and EE is the least competitive, with just five. As we detail further in footnote 23, we define 
an election as “contested” if an additional candidate receives ten votes or more. Using this threshold, there are a 
total of 36 “contested” elections out of 180 total elections, or 20%. 
9
 Africa is the only region for which we have found explicit rules, codified by the African Union in their “Rules 
of Procedure of the Ministerial Committee on Candidatures within the International System – Doc. EX.CL/213 
(VIII).” See African Union (2006: 8). 
10
 North Africa and Central Africa rotate one seat every two years; Western Africa has one seat every two years; 
and Eastern Africa and Southern Africa rotate one seat every two years. See Security Council Report (2011: 6). 
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profit organization known as Security Council Report (2011: 6) there are at least three 
complications. First, some countries that straddle more than one sub-region have shifted from 
one to another. Second, challengers can emerge within the same sub-regional grouping, 
upsetting the rotation.
11
 Last, within a subgroup, some members may choose to run more 
often, while others choose, or are persuaded, to run less frequently or not at all. 
To win election, a country must receive at least two-thirds of the votes in the UNGA (UN 
Charter 18(2)). In theory, members of the UNGA face no requirement to vote for “chairman’s 
list” countries, though in practice they seldom do otherwise (save for isolated protest votes). 
Therefore, to date, after a chairman has announced a “clean slate” the UNGA has almost 
always ratified the regional selection. When there are multiple candidates, if no candidate 
meets the two-thirds threshold for a specific regional seat, the UNGA holds runoff elections, 
allowing any country from the region to enter the subsequent elections (and allowing write-in 
candidates on ballots). Runoff elections for remaining seats continue until all seats have been 
filled by countries winning two-thirds of the UNGA votes. On rare occasions, no country has 
garnered the required two-thirds majority after many rounds. In these cases, the leading 
candidates have withdrawn, ceding the election to a compromise candidate.  
 
3. Hypotheses 
Who wins election to the UNSC? Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) present a cursory 
examination of this question using a simple probit model in an effort to show the exogenous 
                                                 
11
 According to the Security Council Report (2009: 6), such queue-jumping occurred three times in the sample 
period: Ghana queue-jumped Liberia in 1985, and Nigeria queue-jumped Niger in 1977 and Guinea-Bissau in 
1993. In the last case, Rwanda and Guinea-Bissau had been nominated for the two African seats. Rwanda 
garnered sufficient votes (153) in the first round to win election, while Guinea-Bissau received only 82 votes, at 
which point Nigeria entered the race, winning in four rounds. 
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nature of UNSC membership selection for their study of the effects of membership.
12
 No 
published study has presented, however, a tightly focused examination of the question of 
UNSC election using quantitative methods. In the next section, we offer the main 
contribution of our paper: a multiple-discrete choice model to examine the joint determinants 
of UNSC election at the regional and global levels. First, however, we draw on the broad 
literature in international relations and political economy, as well as qualitative accounts of 
UNSC election, to develop the testable hypotheses that we apply to our statistical model. 
We begin with the UN Charter, which asks members of the UNGA to elect UNSC members 
on the basis of their contributions to the maintenance of international peace and security. We 
thus test the impact of the contributions that countries make to UN peacekeeping missions, 
measured as the log of the number of troops supplied. We also include an indicator variable 
for countries involved in intra- and/or inter-state conflict. We further test for an effect of 
democracy, which is often associated with openness, justice, and peace.
13
 
Two further hypotheses reflect the political economy literature. A growing body of work 
shows that countries receive perks from UNSC membership, including US foreign aid (e.g., 
Kuziemko and Werker 2006), World Bank projects (Dreher et al. 2009a), and IMF programs 
with comparatively soft conditionality (Dreher et al. 2009b, 2010). If these same perks that 
result from UNSC membership were also found to predict UNSC membership, this would 
point to the presence of development cycles whereby countries that gain election receive 
perks that, in turn, increase their prospects of future election. To test this possibility, we 
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 Bashir and Lim (2013) challenge this assumption. 
13
 On the association of democracy with openness, see Hollyer et al. (2011). On the association with justice see 
Dowding et al. (2004). On the general proclivity of democracies to peace, see Russett and Oneal (2001). For a 
contrasting view, see Ferejohn and Rosenbluth (2008). 
10 
 
consider whether US economic and military assistance, IMF program participation, and the 
number of new in-country World Bank projects, predict election to the UNSC.
14
 
If countries expect perks from membership on the UNSC, then perhaps more heavily 
indebted governments push harder to be elected. Or causality may run the other way: perhaps 
when governments anticipate that they will be elected to the UNSC, they allow their 
countries to go deeper into debt, anticipating a bail-out on the horizon. Either way, levels of 
indebtedness may predict UNSC membership. We test this hypothesis using debt service as a 
percentage of gross national income. 
If UNSC membership is valuable, heavily indebted countries may well desire membership, 
but they may not be in a strong position to win. Stiff competition for UNSC seats may lead 
the most powerful countries to win election most often. Having worked with the Canadian 
government in their successful 1998 election bid, Malone (2000) notes the importance of 
campaign funds. Canada, for example, apparently spent $1.3 million. Scharioth (2010) argues 
that “realist” variables measuring a country’s power predict election to a wide range of UN 
committees, at least for the WEOG. To test the impact of a country’s strength, we consider 
                                                 
14
 IMF programs themselves come in cycles (Conway 2007). Omitting participation in IMF programs might thus 
bias our results in favor of finding a turn-taking norm. A substantial literature argues that IMF and World Bank 
loans might be given for political-economic reasons rather than need (e.g., Kilby 2009, 2013; Reynaud and 
Vauday 2009; Stone 2002). As for bilateral foreign aid, we limit our attention to the US role for two reasons: (1) 
its prominent place – both in quantitative magnitude and in the literature and (2) parsimony. If we include 
foreign aid from all potential countries, degrees of freedom become low in certain regions. Preliminary analyses 
of foreign aid patterns from other OECD countries did not reveal any statistically significant correlation with 
UNSC election. We suggest that more in-depth analyses – for example Japan’s use of foreign aid to win favor – 
be explored in country- or region-specific studies. 
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three measures: population size (logged), per capita income (logged, measured in constant 
US$), and territorial size (logged).
15
  
A government’s connections to powerful countries might also affect its election prospects. 
We measure international connections in four ways. First, we include two variables to capture 
how frequently each country votes in the UNGA with the United States and USSR/Russia, 
respectively. Second, we include an indicator for countries with “pariah” status in the eyes of 
one or more of the major powers, and hence subject to US and/or UN sanctions, as defined by 
Morgan et al. (2006). Third, we test whether the membership of various political groupings 
that operate within the UN – the Group of 77 (G77), Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and JUSCANZ (a subset of the WEOG including 
Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) – predicts UNSC election.16 
Last, membership in other non-UN groupings may also be important, so we allow for an 
effect of membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. 
Cultural affinity may also matter. The variables we use to test the influence of culture include 
the percentage of the country that is Muslim or, alternatively, Catholic. We also test if a 
history of British or French colonization plays a role.
17
 Beyond religious and historical 
                                                 
15
 We use GNI/capita, as opposed to the more common GDP/capita, as it is the income measure used by the UN 
in the computation of member state contributions to the General and Peacekeeping budgets. We also follow the 
UN’s methodology in using US$ exchange rate estimates of GNI. International, rather than domestic, 
purchasing power is more relevant in this context. 
16
 Because of substantial overlap in membership between G77 and NAM, indicator variables for membership in 
each cannot be included in the same regression equation. Instead we create three separate indicator variables: 
one for countries that are members of both groupings, and one for countries that are members only of NAM or 
only of G77, respectively. 
17
 Since it impacts foreign aid, UNSC membership may be a channel by which colonial history affects 
development. See Iyer (2010) and Bruhn and Gallego (2012). 
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affinities, we test the importance of political affinity within the region, measuring the 
percentage of the region with which the chief executive shares the same broad political 
ideology (either left, center, or right).
18
 We also consider another variable that may be related 
to culture: the level of corruption associated with a country. On the one hand, perceived 
corruption may hurt if regions and the UNGA disdain such countries. On the other, 
corruption may help if such countries willingly disregard norms of turn-taking, jumping the 
queue while paying whatever bribes necessary to win support. 
Finally, behavioral norms that have evolved within the decision-making process may also 
play a role. One such norm, which is observed in human evolution as well as in a wide range 
of other species, is turn-taking (Colman and Browning 2009; Franz et al. 2011). In the 
context of the UNSC election process, the turn-taking norm implies that membership on the 
UNSC should rotate among the members of each caucusing group. This turn-taking norm 
relates to the egalitarian norm, which features importantly in the literature on distributive 
justice (e.g., Rawls 1971) and is consistent with recent models of inequity-aversion (e.g., 
Fehr and Schmidt 1999).  
The Africa group explicitly claims to operate according to the turn-taking norm, but whether 
some degree of turn-taking actually occurs among the remaining regions is less clear. To test 
the possibility that a region practices the turn-taking norm, we construct a variable, “turn-
taking,” which is calculated as the number of years a country has waited to serve on the 
                                                 
18
 We calculate the percentage of the region according to the number of the countries in the region – minus the 
country in question – sharing the same ideology (left, center, or right). The variable is coded zero for non-
ideological governments. See Beck et al. (1999) for the coding of ideology.  
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UNSC divided by the number of countries currently eligible for election.
19
 If the turn-taking 
norm holds, this variable should be positively correlated with election.  
Thus, we consider five broad perspectives: (i) a commitment to peace, (ii) a foreign aid story, 
(iii) a realist international relations perspective, (iv) a cultural approach, and (v) a turn-taking 
norm. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses and the variables we use to test them along with 
their sources.  
 
4. Econometric Model and Methodology 
4.1 Preliminaries 
Let the set of members of the UNGA in year t be decomposed into the set of member 
countries with permanent member status (PM) and the set of all other “ordinary” member 
countries. Denote J = { }Africa,Asia,EE,GRULAC,WEOG  as the set of caucusing groups 
(regions), and let the set of ordinary member countries belonging to region j in year t be 
denoted Rjt, where t  {0,…,T}. We let Rj = t Rjt 
denote the set of all past and present 
members of caucusing group j, and we define Cij as the i
th
 country within Rj.
20
 The set of 
ordinary member countries belonging to a caucusing group in year t (a necessary condition to 
                                                 
19
 Using the model, which we present in the next section, we tested several possible measures of a turn-taking 
norm against a benchmark of perfect turn-taking. In a given year, let ti denote the number of years since country 
Cij was last elected to the UNSC (or since it entered the UN, if no such instance), t   denote the mean of ti, and η 
denote the number of countries, excluding Cij, eligible for election. The measures we considered were: (1) ti; (2) 
ti / η; (3) ti - η; (4) 1{ti > t   }; and (5) (ti - t   )1{ti > t   }, where 1{A} is the function taking the value 1 if condition A is 
true and 0 otherwise. We found the second of these measures to be best suited for capturing turn-taking effects. 
20
 Our analysis accounts for the creation of new nations and the disappearance of existing ones. These events 
change the sample size, which complicates the calculation of the marginal effects. We discuss this issue in depth 
below. 
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serve as a NPM in year t + 1) is therefore Rt = j Rjt.  
Let NPMt denote the set of NPMs on the UNSC in year t, then the UNSC in a given year, t, is 
defined by UNSCt = NPMt  PM. In any given year a set of ordinary member countries – 
NPMs in the first year of their terms – gain automatic membership on the UNSC in the 
following year: At = NPMt \ NPMt – 1. A second set of ordinary member countries, those that 
are in the final year of their terms on the UNSC, are ineligible for election to the UNSC in the 
following year: It = NPMt  NPMt – 1. The remaining ordinary member countries are eligible 
for election to the UNSC in the following year: Et = Rt \ NPMt. Last, historical data on non-
permanent membership of the UNSC are summarized by the indicator variable dijt, where dijt 
= 1 for Cij  NPMt.
21
 
4.2 Preferences 
Denote the utility to the members of region j from electing country Cij in period t to the 
UNSC (to serve in periods t + 1 and t + 2) as uijt = βjxijt, where xijt contains the characteristics 
of Cij in year t and βj contains the preference weights of region j. Similarly, denote by u
GA
ijt   = 
βGAxijt the utility to the members of the UNGA of electing country Cij in period t.  
Election to the UNSC can be conceived of as a two-stage process. In the first stage, the 
regional groups make nominations, resulting in the chairman of each region announcing to 
the UNGA a set of candidate countries Njt  Ejt for election to the UNSC. In the second stage, 
the UNGA votes. As discussed in Section 2, because members of the UNGA almost always 
choose to vote for members of Nt, the vote in the second-stage can be viewed as taking place 
over these countries only.  
One approach to estimation is to model this two-stage process explicitly (see, e.g., de Vries et 
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 UNSC membership data are found on its official website (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc).  
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al. 2009). The resulting likelihood function is complex, however, and often fails to converge 
in estimations that include more than a few variables.  
Instead, we simplify the problem in two important ways. First, we treat the decision-maker in 
the first stage (the region) as myopic. That is, the region’s selection does not depend on how 
the UNGA will act. To allow for strategic interdependence would make our model 
intractable. Moreover, we suspect that regions do not act strategically in proposing 
candidates, although we acknowledge that individual countries have made strategic decisions 
to enter – or not to enter – specific elections.  
Second, we treat the actors in each stage as unitary decision-makers. We make this 
simplification because we are interested in a country’s overall chance of election onto the 
UNSC. Our reduced-form representation of the real election process should be a good 
approximation because the vast majority of elections result in landslides for the winning 
candidate. Regions tend to operate by consensus while the two-thirds majority rule in the 
UNGA tends to produce a single dominant candidate – with some exceptions. These 
exceptions notwithstanding, our decision to model each collective decision-maker as a 
unitary actor allows us to construct an estimable model that proxies the typical election 
process fairly well. Future work might explore modifications to one or more of these 
assumptions.
22
 One could, for instance, model the UNGA as a collective and estimate how 
many votes the candidate-countries receive.  
Under these assumptions we may employ a simple mathematical formulation to capture the 
idea that election to the UNSC may be co-determined by two separate sets of preferences: 
those of the caucusing group (which shape the nominations) and those of the UNGA (which 
votes over nominated candidates). Specifically, we model UNSC election as arising from a 
                                                 
22 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for these two possible extensions.  
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composite latent utility function, U, of electing Cij at time t, given by 
                                               ,1 ijtijtjtGAijtjtijt εuαuαU                             (1) 
which is a weighted average of the underlying regional and UNGA preferences, plus a 
stochastic component εijt. The parameter αjt  [0,1] measures the weights attributable to the 
preferences of the UNGA, and may vary by region and year. In particular, we relate αjt to the 
size of Njt. If |Njt| equals the number of eligible seats, njt, the UNGA merely “rubber stamps” 
the clean slate of nominations from the caucusing group, and its preferences play no role (αjt 
= 0). At the other end of the spectrum, if |Njt| = |Ejt| (every eligible member of a region is 
nominated to the UNGA), the regional preferences play no direct role, thus αjt = 1. We 
assume that αjt adjusts linearly between these two extremes: αjt = (|Njt| – njt)(|Ejt| – njt)
–1
.
23
 
4.3 Election Probabilities 
We view the elections to the UNSC as choosing, for each region, njt  {0,1,2} countries from 
the set of eligible countries according to the utility function Uijt, where njt = |NPMjt| – |Ajt|. 
This setting extends the well-known choice model of McFadden (1973) in two important 
                                                 
23
 We compute αjt using Costa Rica (2005), which contains full UNGA voting records for all UNSC elections 
prior to 2004. Voting records for 2004 onwards come from the relevant UNGA minutes. Costa Rica (2005) does 
not explicitly identify the “chairman’s list” countries. In the overwhelming majority of elections, the patterns of 
voting in the UNGA clearly identify the “chairman’s list” countries (who garner large numbers of votes) from 
countries that merely are recipients of votes cast in protest or error (who garner only one or two votes). In a 
small number of cases, the voting patterns identify the “chairman’s list” countries less clearly, as a country 
garners an intermediate number of votes between five and 15. In these cases we identify the set of “chairman’s 
list” countries as those that received ten or more votes.  Our main results are, however, robust to lowering the 
threshold down to three votes (thereby counting more elections as contested). Obviously as we employ higher 
thresholds than ten, there are fewer and fewer elections counted as contested and eventually the model does not 
converge. 
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respects. First, the set of alternatives is time varying. This occurs because (i) countries move 
between the sets (Ajt,Ejt,Ijt) from year-to-year as a result of the realizations of dijt; and (ii) 
entry and exit from Rt, principally as new members join the UN and others leave.
24
 Second, 
the number of members to be chosen from Ejt is also time-variant, and need not be unity. 
The tractability of McFadden’s model is lost when, as in the UNSC, more than a single 
alternative is chosen simultaneously. To retain tractability, we therefore model election by the 
UNGA as a sequential process, in which countries are elected one-by-one. This methodology 
develops that of Manski and Sherman (1980), who use a multiple-discrete choice model to 
examine household car purchases. Whereas a family may buy two of the same car brand, 
however, a country cannot have dual membership on the UNSC in any year, so we must 
explicitly rule out this possibility. Formally, in each of njt rounds, there is a new realization of 
ε and a single country from Ejt is elected according to utility maximization (dijt = 1 ⇔ Uijt > 
Ukjt k  i). In the case when njt = 2, if the same country is elected in both rounds, the result is 
annulled and the whole process repeated until two distinct countries are selected. 
If we assume, following Manski and Sherman (1980), that the εijt in equation (1) are 
independent across regions and time and have identical type-1 extreme value distributions, 
we then have that:
 25
 
                                ;1|1Pr 1,  jtijtij ACd       ;0|1Pr 1,  jtijtij ICd                        (2) 
                                       ;00,|1Pr 1,0   jtjtijtijijt nECdp                                           (3) 
                                                 
24
 In the sample period 68 countries joined the UN, and four (Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Yemen Arab 
Republic, and Yugoslavia) left. Table 2 provides further details. 
25
 Elections are not independent across time, however. Each year’s election depends on the outcome of the 
previous year’s election in a recursive manner, owing to the evolution of Et.  
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When only one seat is contested in a region, the distributional assumptions on εijt imply that 
the probability in equation (5) of a single country being elected to the UNSC from Ejt follows 
the conditional logit form.
26
 We then use pijt
1  to form equation (6) as the binomial probability 
of observing a distinct country pair containing Cij, where the denominator corrects for the 
impossibility of a single country obtaining dual membership. Note that, by construction, 
∑CijEjt pijt
njt = njt. Equations (2) and (3) require no further explanation. 
Using equations (1)-(5) the likelihood of having observed a given NPMjt of size njt (Lijt
njt) is 
therefore 
Ljt
0 =1;    Ljt
1 = pijt
1
 ;    Ljt
2 = 
 21
1
1
2
ijt
EC
NPMC
ijt
p
p
jtij
jtij




; 
where Ljt
2 uses the relevant multinomial distribution to compute the joint probability of having 
observed a given country pair. The likelihood function for having observed 
{ }NPMt : t  { }1,…,T  is then 
                                                 
26
 These distributional assumptions are strong but necessary to retain the conditional logit form. Also, when 
estimating the final likelihood in equation (6), we can allow for the possibility of within-group clustering. 
Because we model the probability of choosing Cij in year t as conditional on the number of eligible countries in 
year t, our model, like the original conditional logit, implicitly addresses fixed effects for year. For an approach 
that relaxes our distributional assumptions at some conceptual and computational cost, see Hendel (1999).  
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4.4 Imputation 
Fewer than 3% of our data points are coded as missing, yet a significant number of country-
years are incomplete for at least one variable (2,853 of 5,330). Dropping incomplete country-
years is problematic for both theoretical and practical reasons. From a theoretical perspective, 
as the probabilities of election in equations (4,5) are functions of the characteristics of every 
member of the eligible set, artificially excluding a country-year biases the estimates for the 
remaining countries in that year. From a practical perspective, the sample size becomes 
unduly small for some regions, leading to a failure of model convergence. 
We therefore employ multiple imputation techniques (with ten imputations).
27
 We impute 
continuous variables using a truncated regression (to preserve, e.g., non-negativity 
constraints) that includes as independent variables all those that are fully observed. We 
similarly impute IMF program participation (the only binary variable with missing 
observations) with logit. 
4.5 Preference change 
Preferences, both regional and global, may change over time. In particular, Kim and Russett 
(1996) present evidence of a shift in preferences around the end of the Cold War: voting 
patterns in the UNGA shifted from an East-West orientation towards a North-South 
orientation.
28
 Accordingly, we consider two distinct time periods – during and after the Cold 
War, where we deem the Cold War to end in 1989. We report separate estimates for these 
                                                 
27
 The variables with missing values are: United States and Russia voting in the UNGA; debt service; shared 
regional ideology; control of corruption; and IMF program participation. 
28
 Although Voeten’s (2000) analysis suggests much subtler changes between the two periods. 
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two periods for variables where the effects for each period differ. 
4.6 Country-specific effects 
We would like to control for country-specific effects, as outlying countries that exhibit an 
idiosyncratic effect might drive some results, and obscure others. Indeed, as is observed by 
Schwartzberg (2003) and Zacher (2004), the UNSC membership data in Table 2 do contain 
some surprises. In particular, these studies highlight Saudi Arabia, which has never served on 
the UNSC, or even been nominated, and Panama, which has been a UNSC member unusually 
often – it served three terms on the UNSC in the sample period (only Brazil and Argentina 
served more for GRULAC). We are also aware of the case of Mexico, whose participation in 
the UNSC elections of 2001 marked the end of two decades during which it had adopted a 
policy of not seeking election to the UNSC (Malone 2000: note 7).
29
 
A complication is that a country-specific effect, if present at all, may exist at either the 
regional or global (UNGA) level, or at both levels. We therefore allow separately for country-
specific effects at the regional and global levels. 
4.7 Model selection 
The discussions above imply that there is a vector of explanatory variables x = (s,s × w,c,r) 
we would like to use to explain UNSC election, where s denotes the vector of substantive 
variables relating to the hypotheses discussed in Section 3 (see Table 1), s × w denotes the 
vector of interaction terms between each substantive variable and a Cold War indicator 
variable, c is a vector of country indicator variables to be included in the region utility 
function, and r is a vector of country indicator variables to be included in the UNGA utility 
function. Estimating this “full” model is infeasible, however, for x contains some 436 
                                                 
29
 For more on the Mexican case, see, for example, Serrano and Kenny (2006: 298-314). We are grateful to 
Diego Dewar for this suggestion. 
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variables, which exhausts the degrees of freedom for certain regions in the earlier years.  
Instead, we adopt a model selection procedure that chooses a subvector of the explanatory 
variables for inclusion in the model. Our approach to model selection reflects a number of 
factors. First, because the full model cannot be estimated, backward-looking approaches 
cannot be applied. Second, because of the large number of explanatory variables, methods 
based upon computing a reasonable criterion for all possible subsets of x are also infeasible. 
These two considerations point to a forward-looking approach. As our model is non-linear, 
however, popular forward-looking algorithms for linear regression, such as the least absolute 
shrinkage and selection operator (Tibshirani 1996) and least angle regression (Efron et al. 
2004), are inapplicable.  
We therefore employ a stepwise forward selection procedure that, in each stage, selects one 
additional variable into the model. In each stage, all elements of x not already selected into 
the model are added individually and the t-statistic of each variable is recorded. The variable 
recording the highest t-statistic is added to the model (and a new stage commenced) if it 
records statistical significance at the 10% level. Otherwise, the procedure ends.  
We employ this model selection procedure to select two independent models. Model 1 is 
intended to provide a broad-based analysis of UNSC election in the presence of a full set of 
control variables. It is selected under the a priori assumption that the elements of s belong to 
the model, such that the model selection procedure is applied only to the selection of Cold 
War interactions and regional and global country-specific effects. Model 2 is a test of the 
robustness of the substantive variables with respect to model selection, for it is selected 
without a priori assumptions on inclusion. 
A subtlety that arises in the selection of Model 2 is that it is possible that the interaction 
between a substantive variable and a Cold War indicator is selected into the model, but the 
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substantive variable itself is not. Because the interaction variable takes the value of the 
substantive variable during the Cold War and zero thereafter, this implies that the substantive 
variable is, in effect, included in the model for the Cold War period only. As it stands, 
however, there is no means for the selection procedure to include a substantive variable in 
only the post-Cold War period. In selecting Model 2, we therefore augment x with a further 
vector, s × (1 – w), which contains the interaction between each substantive variable and a 
post-Cold War indicator variable.  
We also note that, because of the different assumptions maintained in selecting the two 
models, it is not, in general, expected that the variables selected into Model 2 will form a 
proper subset of those selected into Model 1. Also, although every variable selected into 
Model 2 shows statistical significance at 10% or better in the stage where it is selected, in 
some cases variables already included in the model may gradually lose statistical significance 
as further variables are included. Some variables may, therefore, not show statistical 
significance at the 10% level in the final model.  
 
5. Results 
We present two sets of results, both of which are estimated using the likelihood function in 
equation (6) for UNSC elections between 1970 and 2005. The first set (presented in Table 3a) 
results from the procedure for Model 1 and thus includes the full set of control variables, as 
described in the previous section. The second set (presented in Table 3b) results from the 
procedure for Model 2 and thus includes the more robust findings, again, as described in the 
previous section. To match the timing of the election process, we lag the independent 
variables by one year relative to UNSC membership. We report robust standard errors, 
adjusted for the imputed data, and clustered on region × year, thereby allowing for within-
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region and within-year correlation, respectively, and for heteroscedasticity.
30
 We control for 
the operation of the Arab swing seat by including an indicator for Arab countries eligible for 
election to the seat in a given year (see Table 1). 
The model selection procedure described in Section 4.7 selects 17 Cold War interaction 
effects into each of Models 1 and 2, although note that these 17 effects differ between 
models. In Table 3a, cases where a Cold War interaction is selected show two separate 
coefficients side-by-side in the relevant column. The left-side coefficient is only for the 
period during the Cold War, and the right-side coefficient is only for the post-Cold War 
period. 
To present the results in this form, we re-analyzed the final selected model, and, instead of 
including the substantive variable alongside its interaction variable, we include instead the 
two interaction variables associated with the substantive variable – one for the interaction 
with the Cold War indicator and the other for the interaction with the post-Cold War 
indicator. The coefficients for these two interaction variables are those reported in Table 3a. 
Hence, the estimated coefficient we obtained for the Cold War interaction variable when 
included alongside the substantive variable corresponds to the difference between the two 
coefficients we report.
31
 The interpretation of the results in Table 3b is similar. However, 
when the selection procedure chooses either the Cold War interaction variable or the post-
                                                 
30
 As in other contexts, we are unable to adjust the standard errors for the effective degrees of freedom used by 
the model selection procedure itself. As such, it is appropriate to urge caution in the interpretation of findings on 
the margin of statistical significance at conventional levels. We note the necessity of such model selection, 
however, given the weak steer provided by theory, and the number of potential explanatory variables. 
31
 We do not include a separate Cold War intercept because the conditional logit model has the property that any 
variable that takes the same value for every country in a group in a particular year (like the Cold War indicator) 
simply cancels out of the numerator and denominator (see equation 4 and footnote 26 above). 
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Cold war interaction variable but not the associated substantive variable, two coefficients 
appear side-by-side, of which one is missing.  
The model selection procedure also selects a regional country-specific effect for 16 countries 
into Model 1, and a global country-specific effect for nine countries.
32
 We include indicator 
variables for these countries in the model of Table 3a, though, for reasons of space, we do not 
report their effects in the table.
33
 As well as selecting the known outliers discussed in Section 
4.6, the other countries identified as possible outliers include Nigeria, an African country that 
has pursued an overt policy of queue-jumping (Security Council Report 2009: 6).  
As discussed previously, the country-specific effects selected into Model 2 need not 
correspond to those of Model 1. In practice, however, we observe a high degree of 
congruence: each of the 16 region country-specific effects allowed for in Model 1 are also 
selected into Model 2; only one global country-specific effect not selected into Model 1 is 
selected into Model 2 (the Philippines); and only one global country-specific effect selected 
into Model 1 is not selected into Model 2 (Egypt). 
Before discussing the results, we stress special caution in interpreting the results for Eastern 
Europe and for the UNGA because of the limited number of observations that each includes. 
The EE group contains the fewest countries and the most imputed data. And only 36 out of 
the 180 elections in our sample are contested in the UNGA.
34
  
                                                 
32
 The regional country-specific effects we allow for are (by region), Africa: Benin, Guinea, Madagascar, 
Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe; Asia: India, Japan, Nepal, Philippines, Saudi Arabia; EE: Bulgaria; the 
GRULAC: Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama; the WEOG: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland. We allow for a global 
country-specific effect for Australia, Austria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Greece, Madagascar, Romania and Slovakia. 
33
 These are available in the replication materials. 
34
 The estimates for the UNGA in Tables 3a-b seem of a different order of magnitude than the estimates in the 
regional groups. This can be explained with reference to equation (1), which weights UNGA preferences by αjt, 
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5.1 Commitment to peace 
Turning to the results, we hypothesize above that a country’s commitment to peace should 
influence UNSC membership because of the explicit guidelines in the UN Charter. We test 
this hypothesis using a measure of inter- and intra-state conflict, a measure of peace-keeping 
contributions, and a measure of democracy. At the regional level, we find some evidence to 
support the commitment-to-peace conjecture, albeit in somewhat different guises in each 
region. We find no evidence supporting the conjecture at the UNGA level – if anything, we 
find dictatorships more likely to win contested UNGA elections.  
During the Cold War period we find little evidence of an association between UNSC election 
and engagement in intra- or inter-state conflict. The effect of conflict for the GRULAC is 
actually positive during the Cold War (in both models). The finding is mainly driven by the 
nomination of Peru in 1983, which was then engaged in civil conflict with Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path). Note, however, that Barbados contested that election (unsuccessfully) as a 
second GRULAC candidate. Since the end of the Cold War, Table 3b shows that, for Africa 
and the GRULAC, involvement in an international conflict significantly reduces a country’s 
chances of sitting on the UNSC; for both regions, the negative effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The implied marginal effects of the model in Table 3a suggest, for 
instance, that engagement in conflict reduces the probability of election by around 0.01 in 
Africa – post-Cold War.35 This may seem small, but note that the average election probability 
                                                                                                                                                        
and group preferences by (1 – αjt) in the composite utility function. Even for election years with non-zero values 
of αjt, that coefficient typically is close to zero; E(αjt | αjt ≠ 0) = 0.039, so the apparently large UNGA effects we 
estimate are offset by the very low weight UNGA preferences receive in the composite preference.  
35
 We calculate elasticity and marginal effect estimates for 2005, the final year of our sample, using equation 
(4). We evaluate these using the mi predict command in Stata 12, at the group-specific means x¯jt. Different 
estimates apply to “clean slate” and “contested” elections. The former are evaluated at αjt = 0, and the latter at 
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in Africa for this period was only around 0.05. Hence, involvement in international conflict 
cuts this probability by around one-fifth.  
The UNGA does not appear to have strong preferences over engagement in conflict: during 
the sample period it twice elected conflict countries in contested elections: Nicaragua in 1982 
and Peru in 1983. In 1993 it also elected Rwanda – then engaged in civil war – in a clean-
slate election, but did not elect the other African country on the slate, Guinea-Bissau, which 
was then not engaged in conflict (see footnote 11 for further details of this election). Overall, 
in neither time period do we observe a statistically significant effect at the 10% level. 
We also detect a role for peacekeeping troop contributions, although not in every region. 
Specifically, Table 3b shows that in Africa and Asia, the more troops a country contributes, 
the more likely it is to gain UNSC membership. The effect is significant at the 1% level in 
Asia and at the 5% level in Africa. A 1% increase in troop contributions is associated with a 
0.41% rise in election probability in Asia, and a 0.19% rise in election probability in Africa. 
We find no evidence of a role for troop contributions in EE, the GRULAC, or the WEOG. 
Peacekeeping contributions do not appear to influence the UNGA either. 
Both models indicate that democratic countries in EE and the GRULAC are more likely to be 
elected in the post-Cold War era. This contrasts with the effect of political regime in these 
regions during the Cold War, when autocracies were more likely to be selected (although the 
autocracy effect in Eastern Europe is essentially artifactual – only one country-year is coded 
as a democracy, namely Poland in 1989). Table 3a also shows that democracy is positively 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ej( )αjt | αjt ≠ 0 . We find negligible differences between these estimates, however, so we do not report each 
separately. Estimates also vary according to njt: we report estimates for njt = 1, but in group-years with njt = 2, a 
different estimate based on equation (5) does apply in practice. Last, the estimates vary across years owing to 
the evolution of the eligible set. We have evaluated the estimates for 2005 under different assumed eligibility 
conditions, and find this source of variation to be of minor proportions. 
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associated with regional nomination in the WEOG. As may be seen from Table 3b, this result 
is driven by the Cold War era, for all countries in the WEOG are coded as democratic in the 
post-Cold War era. The only authoritarian regime ever elected to represent the WEOG was 
Spain in 1968. The dictatorships in Portugal and Greece never won election. Since 
democratizing, Spain has been elected three times, and Portugal and Greece have each been 
elected twice. Democratic countries are less likely to be elected in the UNGA in Table 3a, but 
this result may not be robust, as democracy is not selected for the UNGA in Model 2. 
5.2 Foreign aid and debt 
With respect to foreign aid, we find only weak evidence that it plays a role, and not always in 
a consistent direction. In Table 3a, IMF program participation plays a role in the WEOG, 
where it is positively associated with election, and in Asia, where it is negatively associated 
with UNSC election. The IMF has become supremely unpopular in Asia since the East Asian 
Financial Crisis, so Asian support may genuinely decline for governments cooperating with 
that institution. Alternatively, IMF program participation might indicate political or economic 
weakness, reducing the incentives to apply, and the probability of receiving, temporary 
UNSC membership. Neither of the IMF findings, however, is robust to the stricter selection 
procedure of Model 2, and IMF program participation is thus not present at all in Table 3b.  
New World Bank projects are positively associated with receiving a regional nomination in 
Asia in both sets of results. The same finding also holds for the WEOG in Table 3a (but this 
effect does not survive in Table 3b) and for Africa during the Cold War in Table 3b (but the 
effect is not robust to the inclusion of the further control variables in Table 3a). Interestingly, 
both models indicate that countries with more new World Bank projects are less likely to be 
elected by the UNGA. As there are contrasting effects at the regional and global levels, it is 
unclear whether, even in Asia, new World Bank projects have an overall positive effect on 
election probability. 
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US economic assistance plays a role only in the WEOG, where it associates negatively with 
UNSC election during the Cold War (Table 3b). This result, however, does not hold in the 
presence of wider controls in Table 3a. A stronger role is found for US military assistance, 
which, in both sets of results, associates positively with the probability of election by the 
UNGA. We also find that, during the Cold War, receipt of US military support associated 
negatively with obtaining a regional nomination in the WEOG. This result is present at the 
1% level in Table 3b, but at only the 10% level in Table 3a. Table 3a shows a negative 
correlation with nomination in Africa, statistically significant at the 10% level. A final result, 
seen only in Table 3b, is that US military assistance is positively associated with regional 
nomination in EE.  
Of interest, more heavily indebted countries are more likely to be elected from Africa and the 
GRULAC. As debt service contains the most imputed values of our variables, it is sensible to 
be cautious in interpreting these results. Indeed, the result for the GRULAC holds only in 
Model 2 (Table 3b), not in the presence of all the control variables. Still, as we find evidence 
of a turn-taking norm in these regions, governments may have a good idea of when they will 
get their chance to serve on the UNSC, and thus pursue lax macroeconomic policies in 
anticipation of the windfall in foreign aid that UNSC membership brings.  
5.3 International power: population, economic development, political ties, and Pariah 
states 
The finding that US military aid influences contested UNGA elections may indicate that 
politically powerful countries strategically employ their influence. Further exploring the role 
of international power, we find that the statistical significance of one of our measures holds 
across all but one region: the more populous is a country, the more likely it is to take a seat 
on the UNSC. In both sets of results the statistical significance of the effect holds at least at 
the 1% level in all regional groups except EE (although only during the post-Cold War period 
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for the GRULAC). The coefficient estimates in Table 3b imply that a 1% increase in 
population generates an increase in election probability of between 0.46% (Africa) and 3.6% 
(Asia). Interestingly, however, we find no evidence that the UNGA takes population into 
account in its voting decisions. 
In light of the significance of population, one might expect the statistical significance of a 
country’s level of economic development. We find a robust effect in Africa, Asia and the 
GRULAC (significant at the 5% confidence level or better in Table 3b): richer countries in 
these regions are more likely to gain representation on the UNSC. Territorially large 
countries are also more likely to obtain a regional nomination in Asia and the GRULAC, as 
well as in EE, but these findings hold only in Table 3b. The UNGA does not appear to take 
either income or territorial size into account in its election decisions.  
As for political connections to powerful countries, we find no evidence that voting with the 
United States in the UNGA has an effect on election to the UNSC. Yet, voting with the 
Soviet Union/Russia is positively associated with gaining group nomination in Africa and the 
GRULAC (Table 3b). Table 3b further shows that voting with the Soviet Union/Russia is 
associated with a positive effect in the UNGA, significant at the 5% level. None of these 
findings hold, however, in the presence of additional controls in Table 3a. 
The “Pariah state” indicator for countries subject to US and/or UN sanctions shows evidence 
of a change in preferences over time. During the Cold War, sanctioned countries were largely 
unable to obtain regional nomination, as indicated by the strong negative findings in Africa 
and Asia. The principal exception was Cuba, which won election from the GRULAC in 1989. 
Since the Cold War, however, Table 3b indicates that sanctions do not predict UNSC 
election, with the exception of a negative association in the GRULAC. In the post-Cold War 
period, Nigeria in 1993, Indonesia in 1994, Sudan in 2000, and Syria in 2001 all have 
obtained a regional nomination. Indonesia and Syria went on to win election in “clean slate” 
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votes in the UNGA, Nigeria triumphed in a contested vote, and Sudan lost in a competitive 
vote. 
We also investigate whether membership in particular political groupings influences election 
to the UNSC. We find evidence that such membership matters in some regions, but not in the 
UNGA. Moreover, the effects on regional nomination go in different directions. In both 
models, we see that membership in the G77 – but not in the NAM – has a negative effect in 
Asia, but a positive effect in the GRULAC. In the GRULAC, dual membership in NAM and 
G77 also positively predicts regional nomination. No statistically significant effects from OIC 
membership are found in Table 3a, and it is, unsurprisingly, missing in Table 3b. 
Membership in JUSCANZ is included only in the UNGA in Table 3b, and the estimated 
positive effect falls short of significance at the 10% level. As for groupings external to the 
UN, EU membership appears to raise a country’s probability of receiving a regional 
nomination in EE, but not in the WEOG. NATO membership has a pronounced negative 
effect on regional nomination probability for members of EE, but has no effect in the WEOG. 
5.4 Culture: colonial heritage, religion, and corruption 
In both sets of results we find evidence that countries with a history of British colonialism 
enjoy a larger probability of election in Asia, the GRULAC, and the WEOG, but the effect 
does not hold for Africa or the UNGA.
36
 In contrast, countries with a history of French 
colonialism do not appear to have greater probabilities of election. Governments sharing a 
common political ideology with other governments in its region have a greater likelihood of 
election from EE and the GRULAC according to Table 3b. The finding survives the presence 
of further controls for the GRULAC but not for EE (table 3a).
37
 
                                                 
36
 The former British colonies in the WEOG are Ireland (elected twice) and Malta (elected once).  
37
 Note that Potrafke (2009) finds that government ideology affects UNGA voting behavior. 
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We also consider religion, in particular the proportion of the country’s population that is 
Muslim or Catholic. There are three findings regarding Muslim countries that appear in both 
sets of results. The first is that in the GRULAC Muslim countries are less likely to be elected 
to the UNSC in the post-Cold War era. Note that this finding may just be an artifact of the 
data, however, and not evidence of a real bias against Muslim countries in the GRULAC 
region. After all, there are only three countries coded as having a significant Muslim 
population (Suriname: 19.6%, Guyana 9.0%, and Trinidad and Tobago 5.9%). Both Guyana 
and Trinidad and Tobago served on the UNSC during the Cold-War era, but neither has 
served in the post-Cold War era.  
The second finding is that in the WEOG Muslim countries are less likely to be elected to the 
UNSC. Here the effect appears driven by one country, Turkey, which never won election to 
the UNSC during the sample period, but served three earlier terms representing EE and one 
subsequent term representing the WEOG. The third finding is that Muslim countries are more 
likely to win in Asia. Membership in the OIC may drive this effect – all Asian countries with 
significant Muslim populations are OIC members.
38
 In contrast, Asian countries with more 
Catholics are less likely to win election (the finding holds in both Tables 3a and 3b). A 
smaller negative effect is also found in Table 3b for Catholic countries in the WEOG, but this 
result does not hold in the presence of further controls (Table 3a).  
The regions appear to have heterogeneous preferences over the control of corruption. We find 
no role for corruption in Asia or the WEOG. In Africa and the GRULAC, however, we find 
that corruption pays: the control of corruption has a negative effect (significant at the 10% 
and 5% levels, respectively). Ironically, Africa’s commitment to fairness in taking turns may 
be what makes corruption pay in this region, while in more competitive regions corruption 
                                                 
38
 We do not control for OIC in Asia due to collinearity with the Muslim variable. When we do include them 
together, neither variable is statistically significant.  
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plays no role because countries disregard turn-taking norms regardless of how corrupt their 
governments may be. On the other hand, the UNGA has tended to shun more corrupt 
countries in the post-Cold War era at least according to Table 3b. 
5.5 The norm of taking turns 
We find widespread evidence of the operation of a turn-taking norm – not only in Africa. The 
longer a country has been waiting to appear on the Council the higher the probability of 
receiving the endorsement of the regional caucus. Both models show the importance of the 
effect at the 5% significance level or stronger for every region. The estimates in Table 3b 
imply a range of substantive effects across regions: a 1% increase in waiting time increases 
election probability by 6.1% in the WEOG and by 5.7% in Asia, down to an increase of just 
1.8% in the GRULAC.
 
The common perception that membership on the UNSC rotates 
therefore finds some support in the electoral patterns at the regional level. As might be 
expected, the UNGA does not appear to be influenced by the turn-taking rights that apply 
within the regions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The Security Council is the preeminent organ of the United Nations. Membership confers 
significant international influence and also financial benefits. We thus examine the 
characteristics of countries that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) election process 
rewards. To that end, we consider five different perspectives as to the determinants of 
election to the UNSC.  
As candidature decisions at the regional level follow no codified rules (with the exception of 
Africa) and governments keep their negotiations behind closed doors, many factors likely 
remain unobserved. It is thus appropriate to treat our results with caution. Nevertheless, if 
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election to the UNSC were entirely random, we would not expect the types of systematic 
relationships we report in Section 5. 
Our results suggest that the regional nomination process tends to allocate membership 
according to a compromise between a norm to elect more powerful countries – populous 
countries from throughout the world and richer countries from Africa, Asia, and the Latin 
America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC – el Grupo Latinoamericano y Caribeño) – and a 
norm for each country to receive a turn. Mediating this central compromise are a norm 
against nominating countries involved in civil or international war (in post-Cold War Africa 
and the GRULAC) and one in favor of countries that contribute more personnel to UN 
peacekeeping missions (in Africa and Asia). During the Cold War, the regions of Africa and 
Asia may have followed a norm against nominating pariah countries whose presence on the 
UNSC would have upset one or more of the permanent members. If so, the norm seems to 
have weakened or disappeared in these regions during the post-Cold War era, and it may have 
emerged in the GRULAC.  
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has the opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in the UNSC election process in around only one election in five. When it does 
have a say, we see some evidence of the influence of powerful countries. Governments 
receiving US military aid are more likely to win contested elections, while countries voting 
with the Soviet Union/Russia in the UNGA also win contested elections more frequently. The 
UNGA appears less likely, however, to select countries heavily reliant on projects funded 
multilaterally through the World Bank. Since the end of the Cold War, the UNGA has also 
systematically directed membership away from countries perceived as having high levels of 
corruption. In contrast to the regional groups, however, UNGA decisions do not appear to be 
influenced by regional turn-taking norms or by a country’s population or income. Broadly 
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speaking, there is a lack of consistent evidence across regions and the UNGA for a role of 
foreign aid, and only occasional and heterogeneous evidence for cultural influences.  
 These findings speak to literatures on the determinants and consequences of foreign aid, the 
broad effects armed conflict, the evolution of norms, and, of course, the research on the 
UNSC itself. Because Security Council participation is consequential for different types of 
foreign aid, a heterogeneous election process implies that UNSC membership may serve as 
an instrument for international political importance. We caution, however, that our results at 
least suggest the importance of controlling for population and income. We stress here that 
turn-taking is likely an exogenous source of variation that scholars can use, and it has a 
statistically significant effect for the 80% of the sample, where regions make the decision. 
Turn-taking, however, does not hold for the UNGA, so scholars may wish to flag the 
contested elections (20% of the sample). 
As the first detailed empirical analysis of the determinants of UNSC election, our study 
represents an initial step. In the future, researchers may seek to augment country-level data 
with personal-level data on UN Ambassadors. Malone (2000), citing Dutch officials, notes 
that up to a quarter of UN representatives vote without instructions from their capitals. The 
personal characteristics and interactions of the individuals on the New York scene may 
therefore play a critical role.  
As for reform of the UNSC, we propose considering what currently determines 
representation: election depends partly on a random draw of idiosyncratic factors, partly on 
how powerful a country is in terms of population and income, and partly on a norm of giving 
everyone a turn. If powerful countries should run for UNSC seats more often – perhaps 
because they play a crucial role in global politics – we should push for more UNGA 
involvement, as we find no evidence of a turn-taking norm when the UNGA decides 
contested elections. Allowing for reelection, for example, would enable powerful countries to 
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run for election more often. If, on the other hand, every country should have its turn on the 
world stage, we should endow the regional groups with the power to elect their own 
representatives because all regions follow the turn-taking norm to an extent. Alternatively, 
one could ensure turn-taking by selecting through the actual rotation of UN members. We 
suspect that interests on both sides – those in favor of powerful countries and those in favor 
of taking turns – counterbalance each other so that the status quo is likely to prevail.  
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Table 1: Potential determinants of UNSC election 
 
Do governments practice a turn-taking norm, rotating membership through eligible candidates? 
  Turn-taking norm Number of years since most recently becoming eligible for election to the UNSC divided by 
number of other countries eligible (author calculations). 
 
Does foreign aid determine election? 
  IMF program participation Indicator coded 1 if a country participated in an IMF program for at least five months in a 
year, 0 otherwise (http://axel-dreher.de/Dreher%20IMF%20and%20WB.xls). 
  New World Bank projects Number of new World Bank projects starting during the year  
(http://axel-dreher.de/Dreher%20IMF%20and%20WB.xls, coded as in Dreher et al. 2009a). 
  US Economic Aid (log) Log (plus 1) of US economic aid going to the country in constant $US (USAID 2011). 
 US Military Aid (log) Log (plus 1) of US military aid going to the country in constant $US (USAID 2011). 
  Debt service Debt service as a percentage of gross national income (World Bank). 
 
Is election driven by international power or relationships with powerful countries? 
  Population (log) Log of population (UN Statistics Division). 
  GNI per capita (log) Log of real GNI per capita in $US (UN Statistics Division). 
 Territory (log) Log of territorial size in square kilometers (CIA Factbook). 
 Pariah state Indicator coded 1 if a country is subject to UN/US sanctions (Morgan et al. 2006).
1
  
 US voting in UNGA Voting in line with the United States at the UNGA – % all votes the same; abstain = 0.5 
(Strezhnev and Voeten 2012; coded as in Dreher and Sturm 2012). 
 USSR/Russia voting in UNGA Voting in line with the Soviet Union/Russia at the UNGA – % all votes the same; abstain = 
0.5 (Strezhnev and Voeten 2012; coded as in Dreher and Sturm 2012). 
 OIC Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of OIC, 0 otherwise (http://www.oic-oci.org/). 
 JUSCANZ Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of JUSCANZ, 0 otherwise. 
(http://www.eyeontheun.org/view.asp?p=55&l=11). 
 G77 only Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of the G77 and not a member of NAM, 0 
otherwise (http://www.g77.org/). 
 NAM only Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of NAM and not a member of the G77, 0 
otherwise (http://www.nam.gov.za/). 
 G77 and NAM Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of the G77 and NAM, 0 otherwise. 
 EU Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of EU, 0 otherwise (http://www.europa.eu/). 
 NATO Indicator coded 1 if a country is a member of NATO, 0 otherwise (http://www.nato.int/). 
   
Do governments follow a norm of choosing countries committed to peace? 
  Conflict Indicator coded 1 if a country is engaged in a conflict, 0 otherwise (Themnér and 
Wallensteen 2012). 
  Peacekeeping troops (log) Log (plus 1) of the average monthly military manpower supplied to UN peacekeeping 
operations per year (Heldt 2008). 
  Democracy indicator Indicator coded 1 if contested elections fill the executive and legislative branches of 
government, 0 otherwise (Cheibub et al. 2010). 
 Control of corruption Score indicating perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain (Kaufmann et al. 2011).  
 
Do shared cultural traits play a role? 
  Muslim (%) Muslims as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski et al. 2000). 
 Catholic (%) Catholics as a proportion of the total population, time invariant (Przeworski et al. 2000). 
  Shared regional ideology Proportion of the chief executives in the region sharing the same political ideology – left, 
center, right (Beck et al. 1999). Coded 0 for non-ideological governments. 
  Former British colony Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former British colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski et al. 
2000). 
 Former French colony Indicator coded 1 if a country is a former French colony, 0 otherwise (Przeworski et al. 
2000). 
 
Controls 
 Arab seat Indicator for Arab countries eligible for election to the Arab swing seat (coded 1 for Arab 
countries in Africa every fourth year beginning 1972; 1 for Arab countries in Asia every 
fourth year beginning 1970; 0 otherwise). 
1 We code a country-year observation as a “pariah” if it is subject to sanctions imposed by the United States and/or conducted through the United Nations 
(through the Security Council or General Assembly). We do not code country-years as “pariahs” if (1) sanctions target trade practices, (2) the anticipated costs 
are not coded as “major” or “severe” (so, we only consider pariahs as those under “major” and/or “severe” sanctions), or (3) the country acquiesced to demands 
before sanctions were imposed or capitulated at the threat stage. We use the 2009 updated version of the Morgan et al. (2006) dataset (TIES version 3.5), which 
covers 1971-2008. We extend the data by including four major sanctions episodes, which begin before 1971: Cuba (1960-present), North Korea (1950-present), 
South Africa (1963-1994) and Vietnam (1954-1994). For a discussion of these additional cases see Combs (2012) and Levy (1999). Our main findings on the 
pariah variable hold, however, whether or not we include these additional sanctions episodes. 
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Table 2: UNSC Membership (terms held 1971–2006) 
 
Africa Asia EE GRULAC WEOG 
Algeria 2 Japan 7 Romania 3 Argentina 5 Germany5 4 
Benin 2 India 4 Bulgaria 2 Brazil 4 Italy 4 
Cameroon 2 Pakistan 4 Poland 2 Panama 3 Canada 3 
Congo 2 Bangladesh 2 Ukraine6 2 Peru 3 Spain 3 
Democratic Rep. of the Congo 2 Indonesia 2 Yugoslavia4 2 Venezuela 3 Australia 2 
Egypt 2 Malaysia 2 Belarus6 1 Chile 2 Austria 2 
Gabon 2 Philippines 2 Czechoslovakia3 1 Colombia 2 Belgium 2 
Ghana 2 Bahrain 1 Czech Republic3 1 Costa Rica 2 Denmark 2 
Guinea 2 Iraq 1 East Germany5 1 Guyana 2 Ireland 2 
Kenya 2 Jordan 1 Hungary 1 Jamaica 2 Netherlands 2 
Mauritius 2 Kuwait 1 Slovakia3 1 Mexico 2 Norway 2 
Nigeria 2 Nepal 1 Slovenia4 1 Bolivia 1 Portugal 2 
Tunisia 2 Oman 1 Albania 0 Cuba 1 Sweden 2 
United Rep. of Tanzania 2 Qatar 1 Armenia 0 Ecuador 1 Finland 1 
Zambia 2 Rep. of Korea 1 Azerbaijan 0 Honduras 1 Greece 1 
Zimbabwe 2 Singapore 1 Bosnia & Herzegovina4 0 Nicaragua 1 Malta 1 
Angola 1 Syrian Arab Rep. 1 Croatia4 0 Trinidad & Tobago 1 New Zealand 1 
Botswana 1 Thailand 1 Estonia 0 Antigua & Barbuda 0 Andorra 0 
Burkina Faso 1 United Arab Emirates 1 Georgia 0 Barbados 0 Iceland 0 
Cape Verde 1 Yemen1 1 Latvia 0 Bahamas 0 Israel7 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 1 Afghanistan 0 Lithuania 0 Belize 0 Liechtenstein 0 
Djibouti 1 Bhutan 0 Rep. of Moldova 0 Dominica 0 Luxembourg 0 
Ethiopia2 1 Brunei 0 Serbia & Montenegro4 0 Dominican Rep. 0 Monaco 0 
Gambia 1 Cambodia 0 TFYR Macedonia4 0 El Salvador 0 San Marino 0 
Guinea-Bissau 1 Cyprus 0 
  
Grenada 0 Switzerland 0 
Libya 1 DPR Korea 0 
  
Guatemala 0 Turkey 0 
Mali 1 Fiji 0 
  
Haiti 0 
  Madagascar 1 Iran 0 
  
Paraguay 0 
  Mauritania 1 Kazakhstan 0 
  
St Lucia 0 
  Morocco 1 Kyrgyzstan 0 
  
St Vincent & the Grenadines 0 
  Namibia 1 Laos 0 
  
St Kitts & Nevis 0 
  Niger 1 Lebanon 0 
  
Suriname 0 
  Rwanda 1 Marshall Islands 0 
  
Uruguay 0 
  Senegal 1 Maldives 0 
      Somalia 1 Micronesia 0 
      Sudan 1 Mongolia 0 
      Togo 1 Myanmar 0 
      Uganda 1 Nauru 0 
      Burundi 0 Palau 0 
      Central African Rep. 0 Papua New Guinea 0 
      Chad 0 Saudi Arabia 0 
      Comoros 0 Samoa 0 
      Equatorial Guinea 0 Solomon Islands 0 
      Eritrea2 0 Sri Lanka 0 
      Lesotho 0 Tajikistan 0 
      Liberia 0 Timor L'este 0 
      Malawi 0 Tonga 0 
      Mozambique 0 Tuvalu 0 
      Sao Tome & Principe 0 Turkmenistan 0 
      Seychelles 0 Uzbekistan 0 
      Sierra Leone 0 Vanuatu 0 
      South Africa 0 Vietnam 0 
      Swaziland 0 Yemen Arab Rep.1 0 
      1 People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Yemen Arab Republic were separate members of the UN until 1990 when the two countries united as the single member Yemen. 
2 Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until around 1991. Eritrea officially joined the UN as a separate member in 1993 and Ethiopia retained its membership of the UNGA. 
3 Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1992. The Czech Republic and Slovakia joined as separate members in 1993. 
4 Yugoslavia dissolved in 1992, being replaced by separate membership in EE for Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, TFYR Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro. 
5 East Germany was a member in EE and West Germany a member in the WEOG. On 3 October 1990, the two German states united to form one sovereign state. Since reunification, 
West Germany has acted in the UN under the designation “Germany” (New Zealand 2012). Hence, two of the four terms attributed to “Germany” were served as “West Germany,” and 
two as “Germany.” 
6 Although only gaining full independence in 1991, Ukraine and Belarus were founding members of the UN, having separate membership from the USSR. According to Nogee (2004), 
this arrangement was agreed between the UK, USA and USSR at the Yalta Convention in 1945, so as to give the USSR three votes in the UNGA. 
 7 Israel joined the UN in 1949 but only became a temporary member in the WEOG (and thus eligibility for election to the UNSC) in 2000. 
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Table 3a: Model 1 
Variables Africa Asia EE GRULAC WEOG UNGA 
 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 
Turn-taking norm 4.90
*** 7.81*** 1.74*** 1.69** 7.61*** -6.81 
(0.98) (2.15) (0.66) (0.76) (2.05) (10.49) 
GNI per capita (log) 0.30 1.35
*** 1.36** -1.03 1.38*** 2.83 4.21 
(0.41) (0.32) (0.56) (1.04) (0.50) (2.14) (14.16) 
Population (log) 0.75
*** 4.35*** 0.65 0.61 1.32*** 5.81*** 16.56 
(0.26) (1.19) (2.08) (0.57) (0.51) (1.71) (11.52) 
Territory (log) -0.15 -0.60 1.78 0.58 -1.15 -9.27 
(0.19) (0.42) (2.45) (0.37) (0.74) (8.48) 
USA voting in the UNGA -2.35 5.73 -1.02 -3.04 -24.14 -15.71 
(5.24) (5.92) (8.73) (6.88) (14.58) (224.63) 
Russia voting in the UNGA 6.53 6.71 -7.89 6.30 -7.95 102.27 
(5.79) (4.52) (12.05) (6.12) (13.27) (213.50) 
Pariah state -15.54
*** -0.54 -20.50*** 0.66 – -1.05 -10.29
*** – 20.51 
(2.01) (1.80) (2.96) (1.22) (1.70) (2.65) (58.40) 
IMF program participation 0.67 -1.42
** 1.75 0.32 4.63* -20.31 
(0.57) (0.72) (1.39) (0.56) (2.77) (17.75) 
New World Bank projects 0.18 0.28
** -0.21 0.03 4.07*** -10.34** 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.28) (0.08) (1.47) (4.55) 
US economic aid (log) 0.03 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.25 -0.005 -1.49 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.18) (0.08) (2.22) 
US military aid (log) -0.08
* 0.01 0.42 -0.01 -0.26* 0.03 7.93*** 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.33) (0.04) (0.15) (0.11) (2.10) 
Debt service (% GNI) 1.01
** 0.01 -0.49 0.82 -0.19 11.85 
(0.41) (0.67) (0.84) (0.59) (0.98) (12.11) 
OIC -0.28 – – – – 62.31 
(0.75) (53.10) 
JUSCANZ – – – – 4.46 58.24 
(2.87) (38.59) 
EU – – 
40.68*** 
– 1.99 4.84 
(4.58) (1.89) (36.59) 
NATO – – 
-22.24*** 
– -0.14 -40.66 
(3.26) (1.84) (24.80) 
G77 and NAM – 1.71 – 6.93
*** – -36.43 
(1.81) (1.99) (60.51) 
G77 only, not in NAM – -7.79
* – 4.64
** – -48.10 
(4.41) (1.85) (64.42) 
NAM only, not in G77 – – – – – -57.54 
(64.69) 
Peacekeeping troops (log) 0.20
* 0.41*** 0.08 0.23 0.36 -1.42 
(0.11) (0.15) (0.34) (0.16) (0.34) (4.03) 
Democracy 0.82 1.82 -1.52 -20.02
*** 16.79*** -1.53** 19.42*** 8.77* -63.88** 
(0.69) (1.11) (1.02) (2.27) (3.10) (0.77) (2.01) (4.89) (29.47) 
Former British colony 0.06 4.19
*** – 3.75
** 7.74** 19.05 
(0.59) (1.14) (1.68) (3.57) (25.02) 
Former French colony 0.65 – – – – -16.36 
(0.46) (44.99) 
Conflict -0.62 -18.49
*** -1.86 – 2.33
** -17.85*** – 21.53 -182.25 
(0.89) (1.91) (1.34) (1.13) (1.88) (37.99) (143.71) 
Muslim (%) 0.14 2.47
** -4.49 0.16 -286.20*** -297.99** -40.74 -147.55** 
(0.96) (1.08) (4.66) (14.19) (32.85) (131.44) (64.10) (59.09) 
Catholic (%) 0.02 -90.66
** 2.29 1.90 -3.84 -0.51 
(1.02) (35.49) (2.36) (2.90) (3.52) (26.65) 
Shared regional ideology -0.59 1.60 3.98 3.70
* 10.98 1.78 81.01 
(1.14) (3.28) (2.79) (1.89) (14.62) (4.02) (51.07) 
Control of corruption -0.75
* 0.38 1.54 -1.01** 0.85 -29.41 15.69 
(0.40) (0.83) (2.13) (0.50) (1.76) (18.48) (19.82) 
Arab seat 2.01
*** 27.74*** – – – -8.86 
(0.42) (3.32) (37.76) 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3b: Model 2 
Variables Africa Asia EE GRULAC WEOG UNGA 
 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 ≤ 1989 > 1989 
Turn-taking norm 3.84
*** 6.42*** 1.05*** 1.46** 5.07*** – 
(0.72) (1.81) (0.40) (0.59) (1.15) 
GNI per capita (log) 0.52
** 1.21*** – 1.43
*** – – 
(0.22) (0.34) (0.41) 
Population (log) 0.46
*** 3.58*** – – 0.92
*** 3.61*** – 
(0.14) (0.94) (0.28) (0.77) 
Territory (log) – 0.52
* 2.12*** 0.76*** 
– – (0.28) (0.80) (0.24) 
Russia voting in the UNGA 6.59
** – – 8.39
** – 231.63
** 
(3.34) (3.48) (95.44) 
Pariah state -16.40
*** – -18.44
*** – – – -13.67
*** – – 
(1.04) (1.84) (2.68) 
New World Bank projects 0.24
** – 0.29
*** – – 0.95 -6.35
** 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.60) (2.56) 
US economic aid (log) – – – – -0.14
** – – (0.06) 
US military aid (log) – – 
0.32** 
– 
-0.24*** 
– 
4.75*** 
(0.14) (0.09) (1.28) 
Debt service (% GNI) 0.86
*** – – 0.89
* – – 
(0.30) (0.51) 
JUSCANZ – – – – – 31.06 
(19.74) 
EU – – – 39.89
*** – 1.25 – 
(1.99) (0.87) 
NATO – – – -22.70
*** – – – 
(1.38) 
G77 and NAM – – – 3.58
*** – – 
(1.15) 
G77 only, not in NAM – -12.99
*** – 2.34
** – – 
(3.01) (1.03) 
NAM only, not in G77 – – – – – – 
Peacekeeping troops (log) 0.19
** 0.30*** – – – – 
(0.09) (0.09) 
Democracy – – -1.87
** -19.67*** 16.29*** -1.23* 19.70*** 10.73*** – – 
(0.75) (1.40) (1.36) (0.69) (1.25) (2.20) 
Former British colony – 3.66
*** – 1.61
** 6.33*** – 
(1.00) (0.70) (2.07) 
Conflict – -18.80
*** -1.45 – 2.52
** -20.32*** – – 
(0.98) (1.05) (1.02) (1.61) 
Muslim (%) – 1.81
* – – -262.06
*** -209.38*** – 
(1.06) (30.50) (81.46) 
Catholic (%) – -76.16
** – – -4.36
*** – 
(30.34) (1.65) 
Shared regional ideology – – 3.55
** 3.97** – – 
(1.75) (1.72) 
Control of corruption -0.58
* – 1.06 -0.86
** – – 21.99
** 
(0.30) (0.81) (0.39) (10.60) 
Arab seat 1.50
*** 24.13*** – – – – 
(0.30) (2.16) 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on region × year. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
